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Transformation of the Islamic Da‘wa Party in Iraq: From the Revolutionary 
Period to the Diaspora Era
Yamao Dai*
Abstract
This paper aims to clarify how the Islamic Da‘wa Party came to embrace Iraqi national-
ism that was compatible with Islamic doctrins by examining its struggle and accom-
modation to the political changes in domestic, regional, and international dimensions 
from its establishment in 1957 to the mid-1990s.
Historical documents of the Da‘wa Party showed that it had three signifi cant 
turning points: fi rstly, it shifted from a reformist Islamic organization to a revolutionary 
movement in the mid-1970s because of the complex infl uences of oppression, restriction 
by regulation, and segmentation of the leadership; secondly, it had to evacuate from 
Iraq to Iran after the Iranian revolution 1979 because of severe oppression by the 
Ba‘thist regime; thirdly, it distanced itself from the Iranian authority in the late 1980s.
These historical contexts paved the way to its emphasis of Iraqi nationalism in 
confronting international politics in the 1990s.  In the diaspora leadership, the party 
had few resources; hence it had to maneuver between other forces by persisting in 
its independent stance.  It was these complex factors that led the party to stress Iraqi 
nationalism while maintaining Islamic doctrine.
The Da‘wa Party remained fl exible enough to accommodate the multitude of 
dimensions of political change.  This refl ects the compatibility of Islamism and Iraqi 
nationalism within the party itself. Furthermore, it implies the inappropriateness of a 
dichotomous understanding of Islamism and nationalism in analyzing the Da‘wa Party.
1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to clarify how the Islamic Da‘wa Party (Hizb al-Da‘wa al-Islamiya) came 
to possess Islamic doctrines and Iraqi nationalism compatibly by examining its struggle and 
accommodation to the political changes in domestic, regional, and international dimensions from its 
establishment in 1957 to the mid-1990s.
Increasing attention has been paid to Islamic political parties in Iraq, with the Da‘wa Party 
at the head of the list, especially after the U.S. invasion to Iraq in 2003.  I could trace the roots of 
most, if not all, modern Iraqi Islamic parties to the Da‘wa Party (see Figure 1), while the party has 
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Fig. 1.  Islamic Movements in Iraq Overview
Notes: 1) This is a fi gure of Shi‘ite and Sunni Islamic political movements/organizations/parties.
2) Kurdish parties are not on the fi gure.
3)  indicates organizational transformations and infl uences,  indicates partial 
transformations of members.
4) ★ indicates Islamic political movements/organizations/parties in which majority of members are Sunni.
5) The boxes of grayed upward diagonals  indicates that the Islamic parties or organizations 
were established in Iran.
6) The boxes of grayed solid diamond  indicates that the Islamic parties or organizations were 
established outside Iraq, other than Iran.
Source: Made by author based on various information from media and academic researches quoted in 
bibliography and others.
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remained in the mainstream through the turbulent 1980s to 1990s, and rose into power during the 
post Iraq War period.1)  Today it became one of the biggest ruling parties.
Researchers are, however, focusing attentions on various subjects other than the Islamic 
political parties.2)  A number of exceptional studies during the early days discussed socio-economic 
backgrounds, and analyzed mobilizations of the Islamic movements in the slums such as Thawra 
City without grasping the Islamic parties or organizations themselves [Batatu 1981, 1987].  Other 
studies dealt with these institutions as “fundamentalist” or “radical” organizations, ignoring the 
emergence and evolution of these parties [Baram 1990, 1994].3)
Among the fi rst detailed works on Islamic movements is Joyce Wiley’s The Islamic Movement 
of Iraqi Shia [Wiley 1992].  Using primary sources, she argues that the Muslim Brotherhood 
(al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) and the Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami) have infl uences 
in the creation of the Da‘wa Party [Wiley 1992: 31-32].  Following her research, Faleh A. Jabar 
presented an overview of Shi‘ite Islamic movements emphasizing the roles of middle classes non-
‘ulama’ merchants in the shrine cities, especially the cities of al-Najaf and Karbala’ [Jabar 2003]. 
The contribution of his argument is that he brings western sociological-anthropological framework 
into the analysis of Islamic movements.  Criticizing dichotomy of the ruling Sunni elites and the op-
pressed Shi‘ite majority, he avoids monolithic understanding of Shi‘ite Islamic movements.  Directing 
his attention to three actors; the ‘ulama’, merchants in the shrine cities, and the intellectual middle 
 1) A rise of Shi‘ite Islamic parties or organizations, in particular, draws a lot of attention after the Iraqi War.  Shi‘ite 
issues have been examined quoting Iranian cases, as if the Shi‘a in Iran represents the Shi‘a in general.  However, 
it is clarifi ed these days that Shi‘ite societies in Arab World have their own historical developments specifi c to 
each country, especially the Shi‘ite societies of Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia [Nakash 1994; Shanahan 2005; 
Ibrahim 2006].
 2) Yitzhak Nakash deals with Iraqi Shi‘a in general, where he clarifi es that Shi‘a has not been a majority group of 
Iraq in its history in spite of the existence of the four Shi‘ite shrine cities [Nakash 1994].  Other important works 
on modern Iraqi politics include; modern political history in general [Tripp 2000; Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett 
2001; Marr 2004], transformation of Iraqi societies and Iraqi Communist Party [Batatu 1978], Iraqi Nationalism 
[Zubaida 2002; Sakai 2005], mechanisms of rule in authoritarian Ba‘thist regime from various perspectives 
emphasizing Iraqi identities or historical symbols [Baram 1991; Makiya 1998; Sakai 2003; Davis 2005].
 3) Iraqi scholar, ‘Adil Ra’uf, pointes out that there are almost no detailed studies on the Da‘wa Party, the SCIRI 
(Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, al-Majlis al-A‘la li-l-Thawra al-Islamiya fi al-‘Iraq), or Islamic 
Task Organization (Munazzama al-‘Amal al-Islami; MAI) [Ra’uf 2000: 6].  Part of the reasons scholar have not 
paid adequate attentions to this fi eld is a lack of sources on Islamic movements due to various reasons.  The Iraqi 
Center for Strategic Studies in Damascus clearly mentions that the reason for the lack of researches in Arabic is that 
scholars working on this topic, especially on the Da‘wa Party, were in danger for their lives and had no guarantee 
of safety before the 1990s [MIID 1999: 7].  However, after the Gulf War in 1991, personal archives were opened 
gradually to the public, and access to this information became more widely available.  In these courses, detailed 
researches in Arabic on the Da‘wa Party have been published, see [al-Mu’min 1993; al-Khursan 1999].  After the 
Iraqi War in 2003, publications on the party started gradually, see [al-Shami 2006; Shubbar 2005, 2006].
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classes, he concludes that Islamic movements in Iraq, starting from social protest in communal bases, 
has shifted to radical populist Islamism [Jabar 2003: 316].
Despite these contributions of recent works, international activities of the Da‘wa Party have not 
been dealt with.  Moreover, preceding researches have not paid suffi cient attention to transformation 
of the party within both international and regional dimensions.  This paper, hence, attempts to place 
an emphasis on shifts of policies and identities of the Da‘wa Party from longer period of its history 
and wider perspectives, with special reference to domestic, regional, and international politics.  The 
reason for this may proceed from two factors: fi rstly, the party had to confront different puzzles in 
each dimension; secondly, we will be able to acquire a comprehensive understanding of the party 
from this perspective.
In a course of analysis, this paper will divide history of the Da‘wa Party into three periods: (1) 
from the formation of the party to 1980, the year its charismatic leader was executed.  It was also 
the years during which the party constructed its policies in the face of political changes inside Iraq, 
and became a revolutionary party in the mid-1970s, (2) from 1980 to 1988, during which the party 
had to face regional and international politics, especially of Iran after the Islamic revolution, (3) the 
1990s in which the party was confronted severe struggle for survival after the drastic changes of in-
ternational politics.  It was in this diasporic period when the party inclined to have Iraqi nationalistic 
features.4)  A general view of Iraqi Islamic movements is exhibited in the Figure 1.
Hence, it should be inquired why the Da‘wa Party, although it once sought to Islamic revolution, 
inclined toward Iraqi nationalism.
To answer this inquiry, this paper examines aforesaid three turning points of the party, namely 
in the mid 1970s, 1980, and from 1988 to the beginning of 1990s, by describing historical changes 
of the party.  It also tries to analyze causes and factors of these shifts.  In the course of these analyses, 
I will try to focus on three factors; (1) relations between the central government and the party until 
1980 in particular, (2) interactions with regional countries in the 1980s, and (3) confrontation with 
other Iraqi oppositional organizations in international dimension in the 1990s.5)
Through these arguments, this paper intends to clarify (1) fl exibilities of the Da‘wa Party 
in accommodating the political circumstances around them, (2) compatibilities of Islamism and 
nationalism within the party.  These arguments will give a better understanding of what was said 
 4) This idea is based on Anderson’s concept “long-distance nationalism” [Anderson 1998].
 5) I will mainly use the Da‘wa Party documents in general [HDI 1981-1989], the platforms and the offi cial organs in 
analyzing the party of the 1990s in particular [HDI 1992; SI 1993-1996].  As complementary documents, I will 
use researches in Arabic on it.
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about Islamism and nationalism.
2. Formation of New Islamic Political Party: Reformist Activities of the Da‘wa Party
First of all, I will provide a brief sketch of founding process of the Da‘wa Party, which was not defi -
nitely understood in previous researches, and then clarify its characteristics in its formative period 
dealing with ideology, membership, organizations, and ‘ulama’ networks.  This section intends to 
comprehend basic features of the party.
2.1 Emergence of New Islamic Party: Socio-political Background and Founding Process
Iraq in the 1950s witnessed a rise of secularism such as an expansion of Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), 
not only in slums in Baghdad but also in the Shi‘ite shrine cities, mainly al-Najaf.  Hanna Batatu points 
out that most of the members of ICP in al-Najaf were sons of relatives of Shi‘ite ‘ulama’, and a ratio of 
Shi‘a in the Executive Command of ICP increased from 20.5% in 1941-48 periods to 46.9% in 1949-55 
periods [Batatu 1978: 485-573, 700, 752].  Behind this rise of the ICP, I can observe a rapid moderniza-
tion of Iraqi societies, which resulted in urbanization of societies that appeared in the late period of the 
Hashimite monarchy.6)  The immigrants made slums around big cities such as Baghdad, Basra, and 
Mosul,7) where the ICP successfully mobilized these immigrants.  The rise of secularism undoubtedly 
produced a sense of impending crisis of those who related to the Shi‘ite religious establishment.
It is also worth mentioning to the fact that various political parties were acting in a compara-
tively democratic political arena in Iraq.  As Shubbar aptly points out, multiple party systems partly 
functioned in the election in 1954 [Shubbar 1989: 217-218].  This certainly provided possibility of 
creating a new Islamic party.
In these circumstances the Da‘wa Party was established by young ‘ulama’ and non-‘ulama’ 
mainly merchants in the shrine cities.  There are confl icting opinions concerning to the formation 
of the Da‘wa Party.8)  After reviewing all these opinions against historical dates, I would sum up 
 6) Population of Baghdad increased 53.9% from 1947 to 1957, and similar rise of population was seen in Basra 
(62.2%) and Mosul (33.4%) [Batatu 1978: 35].
 7) Sakai analyzes clearly that it was not only “the gaps between the cities,” but also “the gaps within the cities” that 
appeared in Iraqi societies as a result of this urbanization [Sakai 1991: 71-79].
 8) These are divided into three opinions; all are dependent on views presented by members of the party in the forma-
tive period.  Founding year; fi rstly, October 1957 presented by Salih al-Adib and Kazim al-Ha’iri [al-‘Abd Allah 
1997: 17-18; al-Nu‘mani 1997: 154; ‘Allawi 1999: 37], secondly, late-summer of 1958 asserted by Muhammad 
Baqir al-Hakim [Wiley 1992: 32; Ja‘far 1996: 511; al-Hakim 2000: 227], and thirdly, 1959 argued by Talib 
al-Rifa‘i [al-Husayni 2005: 68-72].  These differences relate to how the foundation process was understood.  The 
fi rst meeting to which founding members attended was held in al-Najaf in 1957, then they decided party apparatus 
in Karbala’ meeting in 1958.  And then detail discussions on party’s policies was determined in 1959 [al-Khursan 
1999: 53-69].  See [Yamao 2006].
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the formative process in the following manner.  Five reformists ‘ulama’ and non-‘ulama’ (Mahdi 
al-Hakim, ‘Abd al-Sahib Dukhayyil, Sadiq al-Qamusi, Talib al-Rifa‘i, Salih al-Adib) had the plan to 
establish a new Islamic political party form around 1956 [al-Nizari 1990: 38-41; al-Khursan 1999: 
48-69; Yamao 2006].  They consulted about this plan to Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (1935-80), a 
reformist ‘ulama’ and one of the most important fi gures of Islamic movements in Iraq.  He later 
became the charismatic leader of the Da‘wa Party.  Then they brought this agreed-plan to the high-
ranked mujtahid Murtada al-‘Askari to ask him join the creation of this party (see Table 1).
After legitimatizing of formation of a political party by naming it Islamic Da‘wa (call for Islam), 
al-Sadr emphasized the necessities of an Islamic political organization to join the political arena.  He 
stressed that, “it [establishing Islamic party] is not only permitted in our age, but is the duty for us to 
gather efforts for Islam and distribute them according to wisdom… and to choose the most appropri-
ate means to organize these efforts” [al-Sadr 2005b: 716].  In other words, he tried to clarify that it is 
necessary to form political party organizations in order to play active roles effi ciently in the modern 
Iraq.  Emphasizing the party’s role, al-Sadr maintains that the ideal ruling system should be based 
on shura including ‘ulama’ in the shura council in order to guarantee Islamic law [al-Sadr 2005a: 
704-706].
2.2 Characteristics and Identities of the Da‘wa Party in Its Formative Period
What, then, did the Da‘wa Party try to perform?  It is pointed out that the ‘Arif regime from 1963 to 
1968 is a “golden age” for the Islamic movement in Iraq [Marr 2004: 128].  How did they increase 
their infl uence?  I will examine characteristics of the party by analyzing membership and the 
methods it took to construct its representation.
Firstly, in the ideological level, the party followed al-Sadr’s thought.  His thought is shown in 
The Bases of Islam (al-Usus al-Islamiya), which was used as the textbook of the party’s education 
[al-Khursan 1999: 68, 94].  Al-Sadr emphasizes that the ultimate aim is the formation of the Islamic 
state, but it is not allowed to step in a revolutionary action unless there are prospects for success of 
the Islamic revolution [al-Sadr 2005a: 698-699].  The Party, therefore, did not intend to step in a 
revolutionary movement but to enlarge the Islamic presence within the existing status quo.  Al-Sadr 
himself maintains, “Islam in its methodological perspective is not necessarily revolutionary as is the 
domain of thought.  On the other hand, Islam makes rooms for revolutionary change only in the 
limited conditions” [al-Sadr 1982: 101-102].
Secondly, in the membership, I can point out two important features.  Firstly, Table 1, a list 
of the leading members of the party in its formative period, shows that there is an alliance of non-
‘ulama’ intellectual lay members and ‘ulama’ in the religious establishment.  Roger Shanahan points 
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Table 1.  Leading Members of the Da‘wa Party in Its Formative Period
Leading Member Occupation Muntada1) Founding 1st Period2) 2nd Period3) Annotation
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr ‘ulama’ ○ ○ ○ left the party 1961
Mahdi al-Hakim ‘ulama’ ○ ○ ○ left the party 1961
Murtada al-‘Askari ‘ulama’ ○ ○ ○
Muhammad Baqir 
al-Hakim
‘ulama’ ○ ○ left the party 1961
Talib al-Rifa‘i ‘ulama’ ○ ○ ○
‘Arif al-Basri ‘ulama’ ○ △ ○ unknown 1st period
Muhammad Bahr al-‘Ulum ‘ulama’
unknown 1st, 2nd 
period
Fakhr al-Din al-‘Askari ‘ulama’ ○
Mahdi al-Samawi ‘ulama’ ○ ○
Muhammad Husayn Fadl 
Allah
‘ulama’ ○ ○
Mahdi Shams al-Din ‘ulama’ ○
Kazim Yusf Tamimi ‘ulama’ ○
Sami al-Badri* ‘ulama’ ○
Salih al-Adib engineer ○ ○ ○
Muhammad Hadi 
al-Subayti






unknown 1st, 2nd 
period
Dawud al-‘Attar professor ○
‘Abd al-Sahib Dukhayyil merchant ○ ○ ○ ○










○ ○ ○ ○
‘Ali al-‘Allawi
unknown 1st, 2nd 
period
al-Hajj Khadal
unknown 1st, 2nd 
period
Ibrahim al-Marayati
unknown 1st, 2nd 
period
Notes: 1) Muntada indicates the leading members who studied in Muntada al-Nashr.
2) 1st Period indicates the year from 1957 to 1961 in which the Da‘wa Party was directed by al-Sadr.
3) 2nd Period indicates the year from 1962 to 1972 in which the Da‘wa Party constructed party 
apparatuses and institutions.
* Opposing to ‘Arif al-Basri in the mid 1960s, then founded Haraka Jund al-Imam in the late 1970s (see 
Fig. 1).
Source: Made by author based on [al-Mu’min 1993: 32-33; Ja‘far 1996: 511; Ra’uf 1999b: 9; al-Khursan 
1999: 54-63, 67, 90-91, 121-122; Aziz 2002: 231-232; Jabar 2003: 97-98; al-Husayni 2005: 74-75, 
86-87].
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out that one of the characteristics of the Da‘wa Party is cooperation between clerics and technocrats 
[Shanahan 2004: 943-944].  Secondly, there were some signifi cant Sunni leading fi gures in the 
Da‘wa Party at least in the formative period.  As Figure 1 suggests, Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan 
al-Muslimun) and Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami), mainly Sunni organization 
infl uenced the formation of the Da‘wa Party.9)  Shubbar points out clearly that the party did not have 
sectarian inclination, but had pan-Islamic feature [Shubbar 2005: 209-211].  It is by now clear that 
the Da‘wa Party did not have only Shi‘ite disposition, at least in the beginning.10)
Thirdly, the Da‘wa Party tried to cooperate with the Shi‘ite religious establishment.  This 
argument can be justifi ed by cooperative activities between party members and the al-Najaf ‘Ulama’ 
Association (Jama‘a al-‘Ulama’ fi al-Najaf al-Ashraf), which was founded by reformist ‘ulama’ in the 
religious establishment.  Collaborating with another ‘ulama’ association, the Baghdad and Kazimiya 
‘Ulama’ Association (Jama‘a al-‘Ulama’ fi Baghdad wa al-Kazimiya), the Da‘wa Party actively 
opposed the nationalization of banks and large-scale factories in 1964 [al-Khursan 1999: 146; 
al-Hakim 2000: 243-244].  Al-Sadr wanted to cooperate with the Shi‘ite religious establishment. 
Consenting to this direction, the party acted within the framework of the ‘ulama’ associations 
[al-Mu’min 1993: 50, 96].  Moreover, paying attention to the organizational level of the party, it had 
the Committee of Public Relations for Contacting Religious Authorities (Lajna al-‘Alaqat al-‘Amma 
li-l-Ittisal bi-l-Marja‘iya wa ‘Ulama’ wa al-Shakhsiyat al-Muhimma)11) in order to create and main-
tain solid links with the Shi‘ite religious establishment [al-Khursan 1999: 89-93; al-Husayni 2005: 
85-86], which shows that the party considered this kind of solidarity as important for expanding 
party infl uence.
In addition, the Da‘wa Party expanded its infl uences as it utilized Shi‘ite ‘ulama’ networks in 
general and that of al-Sadr’s in particular (see Figure 2).  The party spread from Iran to Lebanon 
dependent on Shi‘ite ‘ulama’ networks.  For example, al-Sadr went to Lebanon and discussed 
Islamic movements in Iraq with his own cousin Musa al-Sadr, founder of the Amal Movements in 
Lebanon [al-Mu’min 1993: 100; Ja‘far 1996: 479].  Many of Lebanese who were studying in Iraq 
 9) The leading fi gures of the Da‘wa Party such as ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Badri, ‘Arif al-Basri, Hadi al-Subayti, and Mahdi 
al-Hakim were former members of leading command of Islamic Liberation Party, and Murtada al-‘Askari was 
member of Muslim Brotherhood [al-Khursan 1999: 39-41; Sankari 2005: 85].  In addition to this sequence of the 
membership, al-Khursan points out infl uences of Islamic thoughts of Sayyid Qutb and Abu al-A‘la al-Maududi, 
and Jabar argues that there can be confi rmed similarities between political programs of the Da‘wa party, Muslim 
Brotherhood, and Islamic Liberation Party [Jabar 2003: 81-82].
 10) Sunni members in the leadership of the party played important roles in terms of introducing political programs in 
the formative period.  It became, however, laborious to sight Sunni membership after the mid 1970s.
 11) The core members of this Committee are Murtada al-‘Askari, Mahdi al-Hakim, and al-Dukhayyil; all of them had 
strong relationships to the Shi‘ite religious establishment [al-Husayni 2005: 86-87].
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became members of the Da‘wa Party, and there are direct organizational and ideological connections 
between Iraqi and Lebanese Islamic movements [Shanahan 2005: 142-147, 167].
Fourthly, using all these networks, the Da‘wa Party made an effort to participate in politics. 
The party’s document stresses the necessity of participation in Iraqi politics through election if 
possible.  It also presents some ideas concerning the creation of political programs in terms of calling 
for Islam (Da‘wa), making political organizations for elections, and establishing labor unions (such 
as al-niqabat, al-ittihadat, al-jam‘iyat) in order to support the party in elections.  It is effective for the 
Da‘wa Party, it maintains, to promote sympathizers of the party to participate in the elections, and 
to increase the infl uential voices [HDI n.d.a: vol. 2, 134-139, 1981: vol. 1, 85-88].
In short, the formation of an organization in this context means promotion of participation 
in the political fi eld in a democratic manner.  The party tried to enlarge Islamic role in a pan-
Islamism point of view, but at the same time, it sought to participate in the political arena within the 
framework of Iraqi state making the solid linkage with the Shi‘ite religious establishment, although it 
comprise not only Shi‘a members.  This is the basic stance of the party in the formative period.
3. Doctrinal Shift of the Da‘wa Party toward Islamic Revolution
This section fi rstly examines causes and consequences of change in the Da‘wa Party’s policy orienta-
tion toward the revolutionary movement in the mid 1970s.  Secondly, it outlines the second shift of 
the party in the face of regional politics in the 1980s.  Through these analyses, I will clarify historical 
contexts that motivated the party’s inclination to Iraqi nationalism.
3.1 Toward Revolutionary Movement: After the Mid-1970s
These policies of the Da‘wa Party, however, changed gradually toward revolutionary movement as 
political and economical situations shifted after the formation of the Ba‘thist regime in Iraq in 1968. 
An overview of the party documents gives us a justifi cation to argue that the Iraqi Islamic movements 
had their fi rst turning point in the mid-1970s [MIID 1999: 26-27].12)  Why did this change occur?
I can point out three causes of this shift: fi rstly oppressions from the Ba‘thist regime; secondly 
regulations of outlawry; and thirdly segmentations of the party’s leadership.
Firstly, the Ba‘thist regime started to suppress the Da‘wa Party from the beginning of the 
1970s.  As we have seen above, the Da‘wa Party increased its infl uence by cooperating with the 
religious establishment.  The Ba‘thist regime had to stand against it with increasing inclination for 
authoritarianism.  Behind this enforcement of oppression, I can notice fairly excellent economic 
 12) The party document also pointes out that the mid-1970s was one of the important turning points of the party, 
especially 1974’s execution of the party’s leading members [HDI 1989: vol. 4, 198-199].
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conditions in Iraq.  Depending on the massive growth of oil incomes,13) the regime used these rents 
for welfare on one hand, and intensifi ed the suppression to the Islamic movements on the other. 
The oppression concentrated on the supporters of al-Sadr and the Da‘wa Party, and many Iranian 
students in al-hawza were expelled from Iraq labeling them as members of the Da‘wa Party [Ra’uf 
2000: 118, 2001: 109].
Secondly, the regime enforced regulation which allowed them to execute a person solely because 
they were a member of the Da‘wa Party (Regulation No. 461) [Ra’uf 2000: 121].  This was the peak 
of clampdown.  In the course to reach this summit, it became more and more laborious for the party 
to participate in political arena legally.
Thirdly, as a consequent of these political changes inside Iraq, we can notice serious segmenta-
tions of the Da‘wa Party’s leadership especially after 1974’s attack by the Ba‘thist regime.14)  A split of 
the party had already started in 1972 when the regime tried to destroy the party apparatuses.15)  ‘Arif 
al-Basri, a high-ranked mujtahid in the religious establishment, took over the party leadership after 
1972 [al-Khursan 1999: 180].  He made considerable efforts to re-bridge the party and the religious 
establishment.  The year after his assumption of the leadership, however, the regime re-started an 
oppressive attack to al-Basra branch and arrested a large number of the party’s leading members.  At 
the peak of this oppression, the regime executed fi ve high-ranked mujtahids in the party leadership 
in December 1974 [al-Mu’min 1993: 115-123].  This series of oppressions resulted in, as al-Khursan 
mentions, the Da‘wa Party becoming like a body without head [al-Khursan 1999: 188].
As a result of this, the Da‘wa Party was divided into two parts: the Iraqi Committee (Lajna 
al-‘Iraq) which played active roles inside Iraq, composed of comparatively new leaders, and the 
General Leadership (al-Qiyada al-‘Amma) which was composed of senior leadership outside Iraq 
[al-Khursan 1999: 212-217].16)  In other words, dual leadership, the inside-Iraq leadership and the 
outside-Iraq leadership started in this period (see Figure 1).  In order to reunify the leadership, the 
party would choose revolutionary movement against the Ba‘thist regime.
 13) Oil income in 1971 is estimated 840 million U.S. dollars, 1,843 million dollars in 1973, and increased in 1979 to 
21 billion dollars [Owen and Pamuk 1998: 162, 260].  Iraqi oil income increased nearly 30 times within only 8 
years.
 14) In 1974, the regime executed 5 high-ranked religious leaders in the party; namely ‘Arif al-Basri, ‘Imad al-Din 
al-Tabataba’i, ‘Izz al-Din al-Qabanji, Nuri Muhammad Husayn Ti‘ma, and Husayn Kazim Jalukhan [al-Mu’min 
1993: 115-123; al-Khursan 1999: 211; Shubbar 2006: 125-145].
 15) I can confi rm the main segmentations of the party’s leadership once in 1972, and more than twice in 1974.  See 
[al-Khursan 1999].
 16) Leading fi gures of the Iraqi Committee were Sabah ‘Abbas (leadership), Faysal Hilli, Fadil al-Zarkani, Mahdi ‘Abd 
al-Mahdi.  The General Leadership was divided into three factions; (1) al-Subayti faction, (2) al-Asifi faction, (3) 
al-Basri faction [al-Khursan 1999: 212-217].
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These are the reasons why the party changed their policy orientation.  I will next examine 
concretely how the party became revolutionary movement.
First of all, we should pay attention that the segmentation of the party’s leadership does not 
mean a decline of the party’s activities and its infl uences on the Iraqi society and politics.  On 
the contrary, because of the drought in the southern parts of Iraq in the late 1970s, political and 
economical frustrations have been increasing among the Iraqi people living in the south.  In these cir-
cumstances, the Da‘wa Party successfully mobilized those frustrated masses and appealed to people 
there [Batatu 1987: 211].  It was in this period that the Da‘wa Party started to mobilize the Iraqi 
masses widely.  It is worth mentioning that members of the Da‘wa Party shared the military base in 
Biqa’ Valley with Lebanese militias and military organization of Fath in the mid-1970s [al-Khursan 
1999: 361].
Al-Sadr maintains very clearly the importance of building strong cooperation between the party 
and the religious establishment;
“I am now convinced that Islamic movement17) cannot accomplish its own purpose without aids 
from the religious establishment.  At the same time….  It is crucially important for the religious 
establishment to cooperate with Islamic movement in order to accomplish its missions….  The 
relationship between the party and the religious establishment should be organized tightly in order 
not to be destroyed by the regime.”18)
Sympathizing these ideologies of al-Sadr’s thought and political changes in Iraq, the party itself 
was gradually changing direction towards revolutionary movement.  The party held the convention 
of Makka in 1977 in order to discuss party’s policies critically.19)  This was turning point of the party 
in terms of its relationship with the Shi‘ite religious establishment.  For example, the Iraqi Committee 
held meetings with al-Sadr during February and March of 1979 to discuss those who should take 
responsibility in the oppositional Islamic movements.  They agreed that while religious authority 
should lead the movements considering the party’s opinions, both should act as a unity.  They also 
agreed to cooperate, (1) in collecting and buying weapons, (2) in starting demonstrations, (3) in pub-
 17) In this context, Islamic movement indicates the Da‘wa Party.
 18) Al-Sadr’s words quoted in [al-Mu’min 1993: 125-126].
 19) In this convention, following points were discussed; (1) enforcement of Islamic thoughts in the party and 
applying them to the party activities, (2) urgent need in increasing of the party’s members and their infl uence, (3) 
enforcement of Islamic educations and that of calling (Da‘wa) in the party members, (4) needs of the party’s social 
activities, (5) qualifying the party leadership, (6) estimations of the party’s activities [al-Khursan 1999: 231-248].
Asian and African Area Studies, 7 (2)
250
lishing leafl ets of the party, and (4) in holding meetings every week [al-Khursan 1999: 262-263, 269]. 
Moreover, it was decided in the meeting between al-Sadr and Hasan Shubbar, one of the important 
leaders of the formative period (see Table 1), that the religious establishment acquire money and aid 
to the Da‘wa Party in order to accomplish a revolution [al-Khursan 1999: 278].  The party offi cial 
document stressed in 1978 that it was crucially important to make a strong cooperative relationship 
with al-Sadr in order to fi ght together against the Ba‘thist regime and construct an Islamic state [HDI 
1989: vol. 4, 171-172].  Following this policy, the Iraqi Committee of the party acted under al-Sadr’s 
direct command [al-Husayni 2005: 143].
In these circumstances, neighboring Iran witnessed the Islamic Revolution in February 1979. 
This signifi cant event accelerated revolutionary tendency of the Da‘wa Party.  Al-Sadr tried to widen 
his infl uences by sending his own wakil (representative) to all Iraq [Ra’uf 2000: 137-138], and to 
construct wukala’s networks (representatives networks) [Jabar 2003: 231].20)  More than 80% of 
these representatives were members of the Da‘wa Party [al-Khursan 1999: 265].
The Da‘wa Party, on the other hand, widened its mobilization of the Iraqi masses in Intifada 
Safar in 1977 and Intifada Rajab in 1979.  The former occurred during the pilgrimage to Karbala’ 
at the occasion of al-Arba‘in in that year.  And the latter was the oppositional demonstration against 
the third arrest of al-Sadr in Jun 1979, which was assumed to be a great opportunity for expanding 
membership of the party.21)  The Da‘wa Party tried to get sympathizers not only among masses, but 
inside the Iraqi army.  The party’s leadership approved of the shift to the “political stage” offi cially, 
in which political struggles including armed battles, violent demonstrations, and mass movements 
against the government supposed to be operated [HDI 1989: vol. 4, 167; al-Khursan 1999: 293].22) 
At the same time, by the grace of al-Sadr’s efforts, increasing number of supporters joined to 
al-Sadr’s activities and the Da‘wa Party’s struggle.  The sympathizers organized delegations (wufud 
al-bay‘a) and sent them to his house, where they often had an assembly for reinforcing Islamic 
struggle [Ra’uf 2000: 137-138].  Using these opportunities, al-Sadr and the party organized the Iraqi 
 20) One of the remarkable example, al-Sadr dispatched one of the most brilliant his disciples Mahmud al-Hashimi to 
Iran and Britain, where he founded Islamic Liberation Movement (Haraka al-Taharrur al-Islami).  He played a im-
portant role in making the Political Committee (al-Lajna al-Siyasiya) composed of students of al-hawza following 
the order from al-Sadr.  Moreover, al-Hashimi played as middleman between the Shi‘ite religious establishment, 
the Da‘wa Party, and Iranian government bringing correspondences among al-Khomeyni and al-Sadr [a-Khursan 
1999: 265-267; Ra’uf 2001: 167].
 21) It is said that there were around 1,000 core members and a few thousands sympathizers of the Da‘wa Party accord-
ing to the report presented by the regime [al-Khursan 1999: 314-315].
 22) The Da‘wa Party has four stages of development in its political program, namely (1) ideological stage, (2) political 
stage, (3) revolutionary stage, and (4) ruling of revolutionary government.  See [HDI 1981: vol. 1, 219-234, 1984: 
vol. 3, 259-263].
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masses to their oppositional movements [Ra’uf 2001: 163].
In short, the ultimate goal of the Da‘wa Party shifted to Islamic revolution under the complex 
infl uences of the oppressions, restrictions of the regulation, and segmentations of the leadership. 
Iranian Islamic Revolution accelerated this tendency.  Consequently, the party intensifi ed revolution-
ary movement by mobilizing Iraqi masses.
3.2 The Da‘wa Party in Exile: Deteriorating Balance of Power
Al-Sadr and the Da‘wa Party openly expressed their sympathy for Islamic revolution in Iran calling 
for the Iraqi people to support it [Ra’uf 2001: 33-34, 147].  The party declared that it was crucially 
important to accomplish Islamic revolution in Iraq, which should be guided by the party itself [SI 
1980: Sep. 3].  A response which brought the Ba‘thist regime a growing sense of crisis, and led to 
al-Sadr’s subsequent secret execution in April 1980 were the fears that he and the party had a huge 
potential to mobilize the Iraqi masses to the Islamic revolution.
These chain of events forced most of the leading members of the party and other Islamist 
organizations to leave their own country.23)  Many of them were heading to Iran.  The Iran-Iraq War 
broke out in September 1980.  After the loss of the charismatic leader and separation from supports 
of Iraqi masses, the Da‘wa Party and other Islamist organizations had to accommodate the regional 
and international politics for their survival.
What was happened, then, to Iraqi Islamic movements in Iran?  There were two steps; fi rstly, 
unifi cation of the dispersed Islamic organizations, secondly, distancing from the Iranian authority in 
the end of the 1980s.  The latter would be more important in analyzing consequent transformation 
of the Da‘wa Party.
The fi rst effort of these Islamists was to make the formation of an alternative Islamic organiza-
tion in order to integrate various Islamist factions.24)  On the one hand, the Iraqi Islamic movements 
tried to utilize the Iranian authorities for reconstructing their power and survival strategies, and 
the Iranian government attempted to infl uence these movements for its own strategies on the other, 
until 1988 when the Iran-Iraq War ended.  The most important of them was the establishment of the 
Union of Iraqi Fighters ‘Ulama’ (Jama‘a al-‘Ulama’ al-Mujahidin fi al-‘Iraq) consisting of around 80 
 23) There were a great number of students from Lebanon studying under al-Sadr and committing in activities of the 
Da‘wa Party.  Many of them, after coming back to Lebanon, joined to the Islamic movements there and became 
members of the Amal Movements and Hizb Allah afterword [Norton 2007: 30-32].
 24) First of all, Murtada al-‘Askari tried to integrate the Da‘wa Party and the Iraqi Mujahidin Movement (Haraka 
al-Mujahidin al-‘Iraqiyin), but failed because he was the senior leader of the Da‘wa Party [Jabar 2003: 236].  The 
Iranian government also tried to integrate them in order to make use for what was called “export of the Islamic 
revolution.”
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‘ulama’ under command of Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim and Mahmud al-Hashimi.  The Iranian 
government also made commitments to these attempts.  All these process established the Supreme 
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (al-Majlis al-A‘la li-l-Thawra al-Islamiya fi al-‘Iraq; 
SCIRI)25) in 17 November 1982 [SCIRI 1983: 4-5; Jabar 2003: 235] (see Figure 1).
It goes without saying that the Iranian government tried to infl uence the Islamic movements 
including the Da‘wa Party itself.  The Iranian government adopted “export of Islamic revolution” 
policy, and tried to support Iraqi Islamic organizations.  The SCIRI maintained close relationship 
with Iranian authority [SCIRI 1983: 35].  The Da‘wa Party also accommodated power struggle for 
integration of Islamic organizations in which the Iranian authority tried to intervene.
The party, however, did not feel gratifi ed at this intervention.  On the contrary, it gradually 
increased its tendency to distance from Iranian government especially after the mid-1980s.  This is 
the second step of the Da‘wa Party.  Why then did it choose to distance from Iranian authority while 
other organizations such as the SCIRI and the MAI maintained close relation?26)
To put it briefl y, the Jurisprudence Council (al-Majlis al-Fiqhi), which was established in Febru-
ary 1984 and occupied by old ‘ulama’ leadership [al-Khursan 1999: 410-411], was decided to abolish 
in the Da‘wa Party’s assembly in January 1988.  This is called “Conference of Hawa’ Zaynab” in the 
party’s history.  It means the old leadership which had strong connection to the Iranian authority 
was expelled from the party.  Hence, the party could adopt relatively independent policies from the 
Iranian authority.
Then, it should be argued why the Da‘wa Party could decide to abolish the Jurisprudence 
Council.
Firstly, there were important changes of the party in this period; it introduced election system 
to select the party’s leading members from 1980 [HDI 1981-1989; al-Khursan 1999: 386, 390-397, 
530].  This election system enabled the party to decide policies democratically.
Secondly, the party reinforced its organizational structure, and decided to impose strict regula-
tions in selecting the leadership [HDI n.d.b].  Having hierarchical structures in the organization, 
the party became more steadfast in organizational foundation, compared with other Islamist 
organizations such as the SCIRI and the MAI (See Figure 3).  It may safely be inferred that this 
strong structure enabled the party to conduct relatively independent activities.
 25) The SCIRI has changed its own name to al-Majlis al-A‘la al-Islami al-‘Iraqi in 12 May 2007.
 26) The SCIRI is estimated to be an umbrella organization which has strong infl uence of the Iranian government [Jabar 
2003: 239].  Likewise, the MAI maintains its position as following; “The ideology in document [of Munazzama 
al-‘Amal al-Islami] was constructed based on Wilaya al-Faqih proposed by al-Khomeyni” [MAI 1980: 3].
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Thirdly, senior ‘ulama’ in the leadership struggled to strengthen their own power, which seemed 
to inexpedient for the party.  At the beginning of 1980s, senior ‘ulama’ had an increasingly powerful 
voice.  Temporary, they became quite strong in the party.  The position of Jurist of the Party (Faqih 
al-Da‘wa) was established in 1982, where Kazim al-Ha’iri was elected.  The Jurisprudence Council 
was formed based on this position.  In these circumstances, al-Ha’iri attempted to strengthen his 
position in the party by utilizing connections to Iranian ‘ulama’ [Jabar 2003: 258].  Similarly, 
Muhammad Mahdi al-Asifi, party’s spokesman and one of the prominent pupils of al-Sadr, tried 
to utilize his linkage with Ahmad al-Khomeyni, son and aide of the supreme leader of Iran.  These 
struggles for power were probably brought frustrations to non-‘ulama’ members in the party.
Consequently, the Da‘wa Party reached its turning point in 1988.  The party already had the 
election system and the solid organization.  That is why the senior ‘ulama’ in the leadership were 
expelled in the 1988’s conference.  Moreover, Kazim al-Ha’iri was defeated in the election which was 
carried out in order to choose new leadership in the party [al-Khursan 1999: 417].27)  Further, the 
spokesman of the Da‘wa Party Muhammad Mahdi al-Asifi was reportedly isolated in the party as-
sembly in 1989.  After that, Kazim al-Ha’iri moved to Qom, where he becomes one of the prominent 
‘ulama’ and lives in a more academic life.28)
On the other hand, the mainstream of the party established the Political Bureau (al-Maktab 
al-Siyasi), which became the central apparatus of the party.  The Political Bureau moved to Damas-
cus and London, where they were publishing Sawt al-‘Iraq, the offi cial organ of the party.29)
To summarize, balance of power between ‘ulama’ and non-‘ulama’ leading members in the 
Da‘wa Party was deteriorated in the struggle for survival in the 1980s.  This refl ects a distance from 
Iran which the Da‘wa Party gradually created, which sharply contrasts with the SCIRI and the MAI.
This distancing tendency of the Da‘wa Party will ensure independent policy orientations 
considering political situations inside Iraq, while it is confronting with multitude of problems in the 
international dimension.  It will be also a key to argue reasons why the party inclines to acquire Iraqi 
nationalism in 1990s.
 27) It is said that after abolishing the Jurisprudence Council of the party, members started to follow to legal opinions 
of Fadl Allah, the sworn friend of al-Sadr and once affi liated to the Da‘wa Party [al-Khursan 1999: 418, 420; Ra’uf 
1999a: 287].  Therefore, plenty of feature articles and serial articles of Fadl Allah appeared in the party’s organ in 
the 1990s.
 28) Al-Ha’iri now stresses that he is one of the prominent students of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr.  Dr. MATUNAGA 
Yasuyuki, “Mujtahids of al-Najaf School in Qom Today: with a Special Survey on Persian Literatures on 
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr.” KIAS Research Meeting, Kyoto University, 21 May 2007.
 29) The leading members of the Political Bureaus are; ‘Ali al-Adib (Iranian Branch), Ibrahim al-Ja‘fari (London 
Branch), Jawad al-Maliki (Damascus Brunch) [al-Khursan 1999: 419-420].
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4. Iraqi Nationalism of the Da‘wa Party in Its Diaspora Leadership
The Da‘wa Party became diasporic after distancing from Iran.  This section fi rst demonstrates 
attempts at integration of the Iraqi oppositional movements in the 1990s in order to reveal political 
changes around the party.  Then it shows drastic change of the Da‘wa Party’s policies adopting Iraqi 
nationalism while maintaining its Islamic feature, and fi nally it will inquire processes and reasons 
that the party inclined to have Iraqi nationalistic feature.
4.1 Iraqi Oppositional Movements: An Overview
The 1990s witnessed turbulent changes in international politics around the Iraqi oppositional move-
ments.  The U.S. policy toward Iraq faced its turning point at the beginning of the second Gulf War. 
The U.S. supported the Iraqi government in the face of the Iranian Islamic Revolution during the Iran-
Iraq War ignoring authoritarianism of the Iraq regime.  After the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait, however, 
the U.S. policy turned completely, and became hostile to Iraq.  I will sum up three important 
political changes regarding to the oppositional movements in regional and international dimensions.
Firstly, the Iranian government was losing their incentives to support the Iraqi Islamic organiza-
tions because of the failure of their attempt to “export Islamic revolution” at the end of the Iran-Iraq 
War in 1988.  Iraqi Islamist, therefore, could not expect Iranian supports as they did in the 1980s.
Secondly, Sha‘ban Uprising (Intifada Sha‘ban), which occurred in March 1991, started by Iraqi 
soldiers evacuated from Kuwait, failed.  The Da‘wa Party tried to mobilize Iraqi masses utilizing 
its members inside Iraq, and supporting this uprising especially in the marsh, southern part of Iraq 
crossing Iranian border [al-Musawi 2000: 72].  This uprising and activities of the party were, how-
ever, thoroughly oppressed by the Ba‘thist regime.  After this failure, the party had more diffi culties 
to practice its activities inside Iraq.
Thirdly, after the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait in 1990 and the second Gulf War in 1991, relation-
ship between Iraqi government and western countries changed completely.  The western countries 
have been supporting the Iraqi government in order to build a breakwater against the Iranian Islamic 
revolution.  This allied relation, however, deteriorated because of the second Gulf War.
Focusing on the political situations inside Iraq, we can clearly observe an appearance of obvious 
sectarianism for the fi rst time of its modern history.30)
 30) Eric Davis points out that inside Iraq, “sectarian feelings expressed during the Intifada [Sha‘ban Uprising], manifest 
in graffi ti on Republic Guard tanks that declared ‘No more Shi‘a after today’ (La shi‘a ba‘d al-yawm)” [Davis 2005: 
228].  In this way, the word “shi‘a” which had been almost totally absent from political discourse, entered the 
vocabulary of Iraqi politics [Davis 2005: 228].  Moreover, the regime tried to divide the Shi‘a itself into respectable 
religious Shi‘a, on one hand, and lower-class, even déclassé, elements, on the other, who do not conform to social 
standards [Davis 2005: 243].
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Confronting with these international and domestic changes, how did Iraqi oppositional 
organizations deal with?
Iraqi oppositional organizations started to organize and integrate themselves with the supports 
of the western countries.  In these circumstances, what kind of policies has the Da‘wa Party been 
constructing?  In order to answer this question, I will fi rst give a rough sketch of the attempts at 
integration (see Table 2).31)
The fi rst move toward this integration was the meeting of the Joint Action Committee (Lajna 
al-‘Amal al-Mushtaraka; JAC)32) held in Beirut in December 1990.  In the second conference of the 
JAC in March 1991, which was considered epoch-making because various organizations such as 
secularist, communist, and Islamist groups participated [Sakai 1999: 78], a 5-men steering committee 
and a secretariat were established.33)  This arena of integration, however, moved to Europe as the 
western countries such as Britain and the U.S. tried to intervene.  Western-oriented secularist Ahmad 
al-Chalabi created the Iraqi National Congress (al-Mu’tamar al-Watani al-Muwahhad; INC) based 
on the JAC.  The INC was the largest umbrella organization of Iraqi oppositional movements sup-
ported by the western world, mainly by the U.S. [Sakai 1999: 79].  The founding conference was held 
in Vienna in June 1992, to which many of London-based independent Iraqis and the Kurdish parties 
attended.  This assembly was expanded to have more than 200 representatives of 19 Iraqi oppositional 
organizations in second conference of Salah al-Din, Kurdistan region in the northern part of Iraq 
[INC 1993: 5].
What was important in this Salah al-Din conference is the fact that the three posts of 
presidential council were divided among three men according to ethnic and sectarian lines; Mas‘ud 
al-Barzani, Kurdish representative of the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party), Muhammad Bahr 
al-‘Ulum, Shi‘ite representative of Ahl al-Bayt, and Hasan Mustafa al-Naqib, independent Sunni 
representative.34)  There is an important difference between the INC’s way of dividing power and that 
 31) The Iraqi oppositional movements can be divided generally into 3 groups; secularist groups (including nationalist, 
communist, socialist, and democrats organizations), Kurdish groups, and Islamist groups.
 32) The Joint Action Committee was Damascus-based coordinating forum incorporating the pro-Iranian groups.
 33) This committee was composed of 2 Islamists, 1 Kurd, 1 from Iraqi Communist Party, and 1 from pro-Syrian Ba‘th 
Party.  The secretariat was composed of 17 members, and consultative assembly has 48 members.  Jawad al-Maliki 
was elected as president.
 34) Many of the signifi cant fi gures of the INC resigned for various reasons.  For example, Bahar al-‘Ulum resigned 
in May 1995, al-Naqib in August 1995.  Bahar al-‘Ulum, who became Ministry of Oil from 2003 to May 2006, 
mentioned in 1995 that tendency of individualism of al-Chalabi became increased, stressing this is not the reason 
of his resignation [MI 1995a: 28-30; SI 1995: May. 168].  It is also reported that “the INC is turning in on itself in 
factional confl icts” [CN 1994-1995: 2].  At the same time, Bahar al-‘Ulum advocated for establishing an Islamic 
Front (Jabha Islami) of the Iraqi oppositional movements [SI 1995: May. 168].
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of the JAC.  The INC put the positions according to the ethnic and sectarian lines, whereas the JAC 
made them according to the ideologies and existing political parties or organizations.  This is the key 
factor in considering relationship with other oppositional movements afterward.
In attempt of integration, what did the INC and other organizations express? The INC stressed 
the urgent needs for establishing “constitutional, parliamentary, democratic order based upon political 
pluralism and the peaceful transfer of power through elections based upon the sovereignty of law” in 
Iraq [INC 1993: 5].  Other signifi cant organizations are, what I call democrat organizations mainly 
based in Britain.35)  They similarly maintained their platforms that the Iraqi political system should be 
“democratic parliamentary and constitutional government which guarantees political pluralism, and 
the peaceful transfer of power by election” [AID 1993: 2].  These democrat organizations created the 
Charter of Democratic Agreement (Mithaq al-‘Ahd al-Dimuqrati) in October 1998 [IDMB 1998].
It is by now clear that the increasing numbers of oppositional organizations started to stress 
constitutional, parliamentary, democratic political system, freedom, human rights, and protection of 
minorities etc.  A comparison of the platforms of main oppositional organizations is shown in Table 
2.  They had to represent themselves to the western world and request for supports for their opposi-
tional movements, which result in increasing tendency of these democratic western-like platforms.36)
In short, it is clear that the oppositional movements had two characteristics in this period; (1) 
emphasis on the necessity of democratic, constitutional parliamentary political systems, and (2) 
distribution of the positions for fair presentation according to the ethic and sectarian lines as the INC 
did.
4.2 Correspondence and Discorrespondence of the Da‘wa Party with the Integration Process
What kind of position, then, did the Da‘wa Party take? At the organizational level, the party seg-
mented into many branches of the Kurdistan region, marshes in the southern Iraq, Iran, Damascus, 
and London.  These branches acted rather separately after the Sha‘ban Uprising [al-Khursan 1999: 
418-419].  The party literally became diasporic.
At the policy orientation level, the Political Bureau of the party in London published its 
political platform in March 1992.  Its main political assertion is listed in Table 2, which stresses the 
importance of establishing a democratic parliamentary government in Iraq based on constitution, 
and protect the rights of the minorities and freedom of all the people [HDI 1992: 48-50, 59].
 35) In these democrat organizations, for example, there are the Association of Iraqi Democrats (Ittihad al-Dimuqratiyin 
al-‘Iraqiyin; AID), the Iraqi Democratic Union (al-Tajammu‘ al-Dimuqrati al-‘Iraqi), the Iraqi Democratic Move-
ment in Britain (Haraka Tansiq Quwa al-Tayyar al-Dimuqrati al-‘Iraqi fi Biritaniya; IDMB).
 36) The Executive Council of the INC clearly maintains that they have the aim to appeal to the international com-
munity, and the United Nations Security Council in particular for supports [INC 1993: 6].
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The Da‘wa Party participated it the JAC conference in Beirut but refused to do so in the 
Vienna conference of the INC.  The party then took part in the Salah al-Din conference of the INC. 
However, it did not contribute actively to its activities.  On the contrary, it withdrew from the INC 
in around February 1994 [SI 1994: Feb. 148].37)  Why did the party take a critical stance against the 
INC? I can point out three possible reasons.
Firstly, the Da‘wa Party was suspicious of western aids, particularly of the U.S.  The party docu-
ment maintains that the Gulf War became an opportunity for establishing U.S. hegemony in this 
region, and it did not consider Iraqi oppositional movements seriously, since it was merely looking on 
without doing anything at the Sha‘ban Uprising after the Gulf War [HDI 1992: 29, 32].  Moreover, 
the party declared that the aims of the U.S. were, fi rstly destruction of Iraq, secondly preservation 
of the Ba‘thist regime, and thirdly weakening of the oppositional movements through economic 
sanction [SI 1993: Jan. 122, 1994: Jul. 155].  These documents show the strong suspicious of the 
U.S.  The party, therefore, hesitated to enter into and strengthen its alliance with the INC, which has 
strong links with the U.S. [MI 1995b: 30].38)
Secondly, the Da‘wa Party strongly opposed to the federal system which was advocated by the INC. 
Expressing federalism as segmentation of the homeland, the party stressed the necessities of preserving 
Iraqi unity, resisting any occupations, and conserving sovereignty of Iraqi peoples [SI 1994: Feb. 148, 
1996: Feb. 181].  Raising the banner of Iraqi nationalism or Iraqi patriotism which does not contradict 
Islamic doctrines, the party maintained that it would struggle for the unity of Iraqis [SI 1995: Oct. 173].
Thirdly, the Da‘wa Party did not agree with the distribution of positions or power along the 
ethic and sectarian lines, which the INC used in order to achieve a fair presentation [SI 1994: Feb. 
148].  In other words, the party refused the inclination of sectarianism inside the INC.  Moreover, 
the party maintained that the Ba‘thist regime reinforced sectarianism inside Iraq [SI 1994: Nov. 
162].  Party document of the 1980s also admonished a sectarian inclination inside Iraq, and stressed 
urgent necessities to unify the opposition movements regardless to the sects [HDI n.d.c: 6, 27, 38].  It 
is natural that this awareness of risk of sectarianism may take the party to adopt a negative stance 
 37) Islamic Block (al-Kutla al-Islamiya) also resigned the INC in January 1994 [SI 1994: Jan. 145], and the SCIRI froze 
it activities of the INC.  It is worth mentioning that this resignation does not mean that the Da‘wa Party recognized 
the integration of the oppositional movements as unimportant.  On the contrary, the party repeatedly stressed the 
necessity of this integration, but in different ways [SI 1996: Jul. 190].
 38) The Da‘wa Party maintained that the Vienna conference of the INC was not opportunity to cooperate between the 
Iraqi oppositional organizations, but became a tool of the western world in general, and the U.S. in particular [SI 
1994: Aug. 157].
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against the INC’s way of power distribution.39)
In short, the Da‘wa Party accommodated other oppositional organizations with the INC at 
the top of the list by; (1) corresponding with other organizations by stressing the importance of 
democracy, (2) being against INC’s policy of distributing positions or power along the ethnic and 
sectarian lines.
4.3 Iraqi Nationalism of the Islamic Da‘wa Party in Its Diaspora Era
Another important feature of the party’s platform in 1992 is the emphasis on Iraqi nationalism.  It 
stressed nationalism in the face of international society by maintaining the necessities of creating 
a government of the Iraqi people, by the Iraqi people, and for the Iraqi people as following; “it is 
only Iraqi people’s right to select political systems in Iraqi government” [HDI 1992: 44], while it 
maintained its Islamic feature by stressing that it is crucially important to harmonize Iraqi identity 
with Islamic values [HDI 1992: 76].  Moreover, it is necessary for Iraqi government, which is elected 
by Iraqi people, to represent wills of all Iraqi people [HDI 1992: 49-52].40)
Why did the Da‘wa Party inclined to Iraqi nationalism? This was the inquiry from the begin-
ning.
Firstly, the party kept distance from the Iranian authority.  This enabled the party to have 
independent policy both from Iranian and western interest.  The party, hence, concentrated to its 
own problems and issues inside Iraq.
Secondly, the party became diasporic as it distanced themselves from Iran.  What was more, failure 
of the Sha‘ban Uprising made enormous diffi culties in practicing its activities inside Iraq.  The more one 
has distance from his own country, the more passionate nationalism he becomes to have.  Anderson’s 
concept of “long-distance nationalism” can be applied to even strict Islamic revolutionary party.
Thirdly, the party was separated from supporters inside Iraq.  It may be justifi ed to speculate 
that the party was facing to necessities to calling for support by insisting Iraqi nationalism.
In spite of this separation, to be precise, because of the separation from Iraqi masses, the party 
paid sensitive attention to sectarianism inside Iraq which appeared in the 1990s.  Moreover, the 
party strongly opposed a paradox of the oppositional movements in the 1990s outside Iraq.  The 
 39) As I have mentioned above, increasing inclination of the sectarianism appeared after the Sha‘ban Uprising.  In 
these circumstances, the Da‘wa Party highly estimated the conference of dialogue between Shi‘a and Sunni in 
October 1994 in London [SI 1994: Nov. 162], and tried to cooperate with the Islamic Block, Sunni organization by 
discussing with its leader Muhamad al-Alusi [SI 1996: May. 186].
 40) Precisely peaking, I can notice a germ of nationalism in the Da‘wa Party.  It already stressed the importance of 
integrating the oppositional movements within framework of unifi ed Iraqi nation in the 1980s [HDI n.d.a, vol. 1: 
253].
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attempt for integration of the Iraqi oppositional movements was carried mainly by the secularists 
groups such as the INC, which were supported by the western world.  What was worse, their com-
prehension of the division of power for integration was affected by the western way of understanding 
Iraqi society.  Hence, they divided positions and power along ethnic and sectarian lines, both from 
secularist and western perspectives.  Ironically enough, this division of power resulted in fi xing of 
ethnic and sectarian segmentations.  The more they tried to divide posts and power fairly, the more 
segmented the ethnic and sectarian lines became.41)  This was the structure of the paradox.
The party did not have a sectarian inclination from its formative period.  It continued criticizing 
sectarian tendency of the Ba‘thist regime in the 1980s.  Again, the party denied this sectarianism of 
both inside and outside of Iraq in the 1990s by emphasizing its Iraqiness.
To recapitulate, in the diasporas leadership, in which the Da‘wa Party did not have much 
resource and supporters to mobilize to engage with international politics such as accommodating 
other oppositional organizations and interpreting itself to western world, it made the most of fairly 
independent stance both from Iran and the western world.  These complex elements would make the 
party to emphasize Iraqi nationalism, while maintaining its Islamism features.
5. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to clarify how the Da‘wa Party inclined to Iraqi nationalism by analyzing 
three important turning points of the party.
The Da‘wa Party started its activities as a reformist Islamic organization.  It sought to partici-
pate in the political arena in a democratic manner making the solid linkage with the Shi‘ite religious 
establishment.
The fi rst turning point arrived under the complex infl uences of the oppressions, restrictions 
of the regulation, and segmentations of the leadership.  Because of these, the ultimate goal of 
the Da‘wa Party shifted to Islamic revolution in the mid-1970s. The Iranian Islamic Revolution 
accelerated this tendency.
As a result, the party had to evacuate from their own country to revolutionary Iran in 1980. 
 41) The Da‘wa Party tried to produce any alternative ways of integrating the oppositional movements.  Starting 
from the conference of Damascus in December 1995, in which many big names of oppositional movements such 
as Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim (the SCIRI), Muhammad Mahdi al-Asifi (the Da‘wa Party), Taqi al-Mudarrisi 
(Munazzama), Mas‘ud al-Barzani (the KDP) and so on, gathered to adjust the movements in April 1996 [SI 1996: 
Jan. 179, Apr. 184].  Moreover, Jawad al-Maliki had some meetings with members of the SCIRI in Damascus to 
discuss how to integrate oppositional organizations including Islamist, nationalists, and the ICP [SI 1996: Apr. 
185].
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This was the second turning point.
The third wave of shift struck the party as a balance of power between ‘ulama’ and non-‘ulama’ 
leading members in the party was deteriorated in the struggle for survival in the late 1980s.  Hence, 
the party gradually created a distance from the Iranian authority which supported a number of ‘ulama’ 
in the party.  This paved the way to its Iraqi nationalism in confronting with international politics.
In addition to these historical contexts, there were three important factors which led the party 
to emphasize Iraqi nationalism, namely: fi rst the independent policy; second the diasporic situation; 
and third the separation from supporters within Iraq.  In the diaspora leadership, the party had few 
resource, hence it had to maneuver between other forces by persisting in its independent stance.  It 
was these complex factors that led the party to emphasize Iraqi nationalism while maintaining the 
Islamic doctrine.
It is apparent from the arguments above that the Da‘wa Party had been accommodating 
the multitude dimensions of political changes with its fl exibility.  This refl ects a compatibility of 
Islamism and nationalism within the party itself.  In other words, this implies an inappropriateness 
of dichotomous understanding of Islamism and nationalism, at least within the Da‘wa Party.
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